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Why Stokes’ England repeated — and reversed — the same tactical mistake two Ashes series in a row

Australia vs England, 2nd Test (Day/Night) at The Gabba, Brisbane, The Ashes:

When to Declare and When to bat on for Ben Stokes

The Pink-Ball Window England Still Don’t Understand

Why Stokes’ England repeated — and reversed — the same tactical mistake two Ashes series in a row

The Ashes has always been a stage where small decisions shape enormous outcomes.

But across three different series — 2017, 2023, and now 2025 — a clear pattern has emerged:

**Australia learn.

England don’t.**

And nothing illustrates that better than England’s failure to exploit the pink-ball window at the Gabba this week — a failure that mirrors, and in many ways reverses, the infamous Day 1 declaration at Edgbaston two years ago.

2023 Edgbaston — The Over-Aggressive Mistake

England began the 2023 Ashes with pure Bazball theatre.

Flat pitch.

Root in complete command.

Australia unable to dismiss him.

The perfect moment to keep piling on pressure.

Instead:

Ben Stokes declared on Day 1.

When Joe Root was hitting sixers for fun

It was bold.

It was dramatic.

It was historic.

It also cost England the Test.

This was the classic example of a team overplaying aggression — choosing emotional momentum over tactical clarity.

2025 Brisbane — The Overcorrection

Fast forward to Brisbane. Late Day 1,

Joe Root smashing sixes for fun…Again!

Stokes watching on this time laughing & smiling, the innings drifting along happily.

But the tactical failure happened much earlier.

England batted with none of the urgency, intent, or tempo that defines Bazball.

Instead of controlling the game’s rhythm, they allowed the match to drift into the one place you can never afford in a pink-ball Test:

Tactical no-man’s land.

They weren’t good enough to bat five sessions like Australia might.

And they weren’t brave enough to compress their Day 1 Innings into the 60–65 over Bazball burst required to create a pink-ball assault before stumps.

They executed neither plan.

And in day–night cricket, doing neither is fatal.

What Bazball Should Have Looked Like

Bazball is not reckless hitting.

It is controlled tempo.

It is match manipulation.

It is using pressure and speed to create time.

In a pink-ball Test, batting aggressively early is not a stylistic choice — it could have, should have been England's entire Day 1 strategy.

Had England batted in true Bazball fashion for the first 60–65 overs — with intent, urgency, and scoreboard pressure — they would have seized control of the match and, crucially, created the most valuable window in day-night cricket:

Bowling at Australia’s top order under lights with a brand-new pink ball.

Instead, they drifted.

Not decisive enough to attack.

Not dominant enough to bat long.

The Risk Management Equation England Missed

And from a pure risk-management perspective, the downside wasn’t even that severe.

Even if England played with more aggression early and found themselves in trouble, they still almost certainly reach 50 overs — which is plenty to regroup and still unleash the pink ball under lights.

Worst-case scenario:

They collapse early, reach 50 overs anyway (quite possibly more, and still get their redemption window with the ball.

Best-case scenario:

They take 2–3 or more wickets under lights and flip the whole Test.

When you look at the risk–reward profile, England’s passive approach makes very little sense.

This is the exact principle — low-risk, high-reward windows — that sits at the heart of elite match strategy. Strong edges aren’t about guessing outcomes; they’re about recognizing asymmetric opportunities and acting decisively.

The 2017 Adelaide Pink Ball (Day/Night) Lesson Australia Learned — and England Didn’t

Here’s what makes this more striking:

England have already experienced the power of the pink-ball window — in 2017, at Adelaide.

Australia led by 215 runs.

Steve Smith chose not to enforce the follow-on.

There were 26 overs left in the evening session.

Conditions were perfect for swing.

England were handed a gift.

And they cashed it in — fast.

Australia collapsed to 4/53 under lights.

Anderson took two.

Woakes took two.

Both bowlers who generally struggle in Australian conditions unless given the right bowling conditions such a fresh new pink ball under lights.

Australia were bowled out for 138.

After the match, Steve Smith admitted publicly:

“I don’t think we’ll be making that mistake again.”

He was right.

Australia learned immediately.

They have never repeated that error in a pink-ball Test.

England, by contrast, have failed to evolve.

They made a bold mistake in 2023.

They made a passive mistake in 2025.

Both came from the same root problem:

England’s mistake wasn’t just about declaring too early in 2023 — it was also about failing attack early with the Day 1 to declare when it mattered then attack with the new ball under lights in 2025.

Even Elite Players Can Misread the Format

The deeper truth is this:

Even world-class players — even national captains — can misread the tactical demands of day–night cricket.

Pink-ball Tests require a different operating system:

Different use of time

Different scoring tempo

Different declaration windows

Different field and bowling plans

Different understanding of risk

Traditional Test logic doesn’t apply.

Pink-ball cricket punishes teams who cling to old formulas.

Australia learned that in 2017.

England, eight years later, still haven’t.

Conclusion: Missed Window, Missed Match

The pink ball flips the structure of a Test match.

It rewards boldness.

It creates short, high-value windows where games can be won or lost in a session.

England had that window.

They didn’t recognise it.

They didn’t pursue it.

They didn’t shape the match around it.

And Australia — as they so often do at home — simply waited for the mistake.

England made it.

And the Test was gone.

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